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This article examines whether the punch line that you can tell when lawyers
are lying by confirming that their lips are moving applies to their conduct when
negotiating in mediations. General surveys of lawyer honesty suggest that this
perception probably does apply to the way lawyers negotiate in mediations. Only
20% of people surveyed in a 1993 American Bar Association poll described the
legal profession as honest, and that number fell to 14% in a 1998 Gallup poll.' A
more recent poll revealed that one-third of the American public believes that law-
yers are less truthful than most people.2
A lawyer friend who mediates circuit court cases and other substantial matters
in Florida told me that his professional life is lived in a "fog of lies and spin"
emanating from lawyers with whom he works. 3 Another mediator commented
that "the spinning that goes on in mediation is truly enough to make one dizzy."
4
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1. W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American Lawyers: Perception, Reality,
and the Professional Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. REV. 527, 528 n.3 (2002).
2. E. Cliff Martin & Karena Dees, The Truth About Truthfulness: The Proposed Commentary to
Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 777, 779 (2002).
3. J. Joaquin Fraxedas, discussion with author (March 26, 2004).
4. Ed Ahrens Jr., There Are Lies and There Are Lies, http://www.floridamediationgroup.coml (last
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When I asked another friend who mediates in Florida how frequently lawyers lie
during his mediations, he said, "Practically all the time." 5 An Arizona mediator
who often teaches others studying to become mediators tells them not to believe
"anything a lawyer tells you during a mediation." 6
I. INTRODUCTION
These findings and comments piqued this author's interest in investigating
how lawyers are handling a core ethical choice to act honestly when negotiating
on behalf of clients during mediations. Little published empirical work exists on
how honestly lawyers negotiate generally and none this author could find de-
scribes attorney behaviors when they negotiate in voluntary, contractually-
required, or court-ordered mediations. The topic of lawyer honesty in mediations
also has received little focused attention from scholars. This article approaches
both gaps by integrating data derived from questionnaires answered at a continu-
ing legal education workshop for lawyers and mediators 7 with analysis of infor-
mation categories commonly disclosed during third-party assisted negotiations.
This article analyzes survey information using the categories the legal profes-
sion employs to regulate negotiating honesty: material facts, non-material facts,
and opinions. It then examines other important groupings of information essential
to negotiating and mediating not mentioned directly in ethics regulations including
agreement alternatives, interests, and priorities. This article concludes by making
and defending a claim that regulatory reform is needed to encourage more truth-
telling about interests, the core component of value-creation and problem-solving
in negotiation and mediation.
Adopting the definition of lying proposed by Professor Gerald Wetlaufer, the
questionnaire investigated the frequency of intentional statements by which
speakers attempt to create in others understandings different from the speakers'
actual views8 regarding the above information categories. Designed to avoid con-
cerns and debates about what truth is and whether knowable truth exists, this defi-
nition focuses on speakers' intentions to create beliefs in listeners that diverge
from negotiators' own understandings. Because communication recipients seldom
have direct knowledge of speakers' intentions and understandings, the question-
naire focused on observations and defined them as personal witnessing of remarks
produced by others or themselves, including both actual knowledge and strong
suspicions. 9 This broad definition allowed respondents to self-disclose anony-
5. Chester Chance, discussion with author (February 9, 2006).
6. Bruce E. Myerson, Telling the Truth in Mediation: Mediator Owed Duty of Candor, DIsP. RESO-
L. MAG., Winter 1997, at 17.
7. This Conference was the annual workshop sponsored by the ADR Committee of the Litigation
Section of the Florida Bar, held on March 26, 2004, in Orlando, Florida. It was attended by forty
lawyers and mediators and this essay reports data from twenty-three completed questionnaires. This
essay reports averages of the estimates respondents shared on each inquiry and their occasional written
comments. Ranges and medians for each mean are provided in these notes.
8. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Neogtiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1223 (1990).
9. Of course, this definition does not establish that lies actually were told, often a very difficult
event to establish. As one respondent noted, "if the negotiator/lawyer is lying, it is rare that I would
know. My percentages are based more on suspicion than fact." Survey response (March 26, 2004) (on
file with author).
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mously the frequency with which they engaged in deceptive statements about
these information categories1 ° and to estimate how often they suspected others lied
about these categories of information in negotiations and mediations. Responses
came from twenty-three lawyers, five of whom were practicing mediators.11 Al-
though far from rigorous empirical investigation, this survey employed methods
similar to those used in much of the limited research regarding attorney truthful-
ness in negotiation.12
II. LYING ABOUT MATERIAL FACTS
Communications regarding material facts constitute the category of informa-
tion most directly regulated by existing ethical rules and substantive doctrines.
Nothing in the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules), as enacted by the forty-four states which pattern their ethical gov-
ernance substantially on these guidelines, directly addresses lawyers' obligations
to be truthful when negotiating during mediations. Despite arguments to do so,
the Ethics 2000 Commission charged with making necessary amendments to the
Model Rules, chose not to recommend for mediation the more stringent standard
of honesty which applies to trials and forbids false statements regarding all facts
regardless of materiality. 13 This makes it safe to assume that the regulations re-
garding truthfulness in negotiation apply to mediations.
Model Rule 4.1 applies to lawyers' statements to others, and it prohibits at-
tomeys from knowingly making false statements of material fact or law to third
10. My questionnaire did not attempt to discern whether responses came from personal or suspicion-
based experiences. Lawyers responding to questions about caucuses, however, had only their behavior
to evaluate. This may partially explain the higher average estimates for lies in joint sessions than
caucuses. See infra notes 33, 34, 81, 82, 98, 99.
11. Respondents included sixteen males and seven females and averaged nineteen years of experi-
ence, ranging from a high of forty to a low of three. The five mediators were men and averaged
twenty-eight years of experience.
12. Virtually all of the published articles describing negotiation honesty involve similar approaches
collecting information based on questionnaires or interviews. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Ethics by the
Numbers, 83 A.B.A. J. 97 (Oct. 1997) (survey of nearly 100 lawyers attending an ABA Annual Meet-
ing); Scott S. Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in Negotiations, 8 REv. LrIG. 173
(1989) (interviews presenting 10 scenarios to 14 attorneys); Larry Lempert, In Settlement Talks, Does
Telling The Truth Have Its Limits, 1 INSIDE LITIG. 1 (1988) (interviews presenting four hypothetical
situations to nine law professors who have written on ethics, five experienced litigators, and one
judge). One of this survey's respondents accurately commented: "I do not believe that this survey nor
the way in which it was given constitutes empirical data." Survey response (March 26, 2004) (on file
with author). My questionnaire was an explorative study of a group that can hardly be called a sample
of anything other than lawyers and mediators who were willing to share their observations. Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a
Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 761, n.4 (1990). The group surveyed was small and its
members may easily represent a biased collection. Id.
13. Model Rule of Professional Conduct R. 3.3 prohibits knowingly making false statements of fact
to tribunals regardless of their materiality. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.3 (2004). Despite
urgings to do so, the ABA did not include mediation in its definition of tribunal as part of the Ethics
2000 Commission's revision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Focusing on the non-
adjudicative nature of mediation rather than its frequent direct connection to judicial proceedings when
mandated by courts, the Model Rules define tribunal as "a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration
proceeding, or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.0(m) (2004).
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parties when representing clients. This Rule prohibits lawyers from lying about
material facts when negotiating inside and outside of mediation. Although Model
Rule 8.4 generally prohibits lawyers from engaging in dishonest, deceitful, and
fraudulent conduct, many scholars and commentators conclude that the more spe-
cific provisions of Model Rule 4.1 govern lawyer truthfulness when negotiating.'
4
The prohibition of Model Rule 4.1 against lying about material facts largely
replicates substantive doctrines of fraud which can make agreements vulnerable to
invalidation. 15  American fraud law touches many negotiation behavioral deci-
sions and seems to be expanding its reach. 16 Reflecting these substantive trends,
the Ethics 2000 Commission amended the Comments to Model Rule 4.1 to an-
nounce that material fact lies can occur if lawyers "incorporate or affirm" state-
ments of others they know are false. Material fact lies also occur when lawyers
use "partially true but misleading" assertions in contexts that make them the
"equivalent of affirmative false" communications. 17 Courts are likely to find this
equivalence when other facts are vital and not easily accessible to the persons who
receive selective, partial communications.'
8
Lawyers who lie about material facts when negotiating inside or outside of
mediation risk ethical discipline by the legal profession for violating Rule 4.119
and for assisting their clients in committing fraud.20 They also risk civil liability
for fraud, 21 deceit,22 and legal malpractice. 23 Although instances where lawyers
14. Steven H. Resnicoff, Lying and Lawyering: Contrasting American and Jewish Law, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 937, 939-40 (2002) (Model Rule 8.4(c) intended to be broad and cover conduct that
otherwise might slip through the cracks and not be banned by more specific rules provisions). Model
Rule 8.4 (c) "can and has been invoked" to ensure lawyers comply with their duties "to be honest and
fair in negotiation." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality, and Professional Responsibility in
Negotiation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS, A COMPREHENSIvE GUIDE 119, 137-38 (Phyllis Bernard
& Bryant Garth eds., 2002) [hereinafter ETHICS IN NEGOTIATION].
15. Courts have always imposed liability on those who knowingly misrepresent facts in negotiation.
Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 411, 416 (1988). A contract theory of fraudulent misrepresentation allows parties
induced into contracts by another's lies to rescind and a tort theory of deceit permits recovery for
resulting economic harm. Id. Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., a principal drafter of the comments to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, concluded that "legal regulation of lawyer trustworthiness
cannot go much further than to proscribe fraud." Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to be
Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 196 (1981).
16. G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR
REASONABLE PEOPLE 206 (1999). State legislatures, courts, and other regulatory organizations such as
the American Law Institute and National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have been broaden-
ing the meaning and scope of American fraud law. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 141.
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUC R. 4.1 CMT. 1 (2004).
18. See SHELL, supra note 16, at 208-09.
19. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Vamer, 780 So. 2d I (Fla. 2001) (lying about filing suit); Fla. Bar v.
Cramer, 678 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1996) (lying about who would be using leased office equipment); Fla.
Bar v. McLawhom, 505 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1987) (falsely told health care providers with unpaid bills
that his client's verdict was not sufficient to satisfy outstanding financial obligations); In re Eliasen,
913 P.2d 1163 (Idaho 1996) (falsely told debtor he would lose his driver's license if he did not pay a
loan); Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002) (lawyer lied about mak-
ing confidential arrangements to learn identity of employee allegedly engaging in misconduct to obtain
a dollar settlement); In re Hendricks, 462 S.E.2d 286 (S.C.1995) (lying to title insurer).
20. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) prohibits lawyers from assisting clients "in conduct
the lawyer knows is ... fraudulent." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2004).
21. See, e.g., Slotkin v. Citizen's Casualty Co., 614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979) (lawyer who misrepre-
sented amount of insurance coverage available in settlement negotiations of an infant's medical mal-
practice claim held liable for fraud); Hansen v. Anderson, Wilmarth & Van Der Maaten, 657 N.W. 2d
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are disciplined for lying about material facts and assisting client frauds seem to be
increasing,24 most actual regulation of lawyer honesty regarding this information
category occurs when parties later seek to challenge agreements they negotiated
inside or outside of mediation. 25 While aggrieved participants have the ability to
challenge agreements based on lies about other negotiation topics, they typically
have greater motivation to discover that important external facts, independent of
lawyers' negotiation strategies, were not as represented.
Despite these prohibitions and risks, and despite concerns about reputation in
repeat encounters, empirical research suggests that lawyers lie about material facts
when negotiating. A survey of a national sample of lawyers showed that 51%
believe that "unfair and inadequate disclosure of material information during pre-
trial negotiation is a regular or frequent problem." 26 Another survey of civil litiga-
tors in Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan showed that 20% believed that opposing
lawyers routinely lied about material facts during non-mediated negotiations."
Mirroring that research, the average of estimates from respondents answering the
questionnaire regarding lying about material facts was that such lying occurred in
23% of the non-mediated negotiations in which they participated.28
Many facets of mediation constrain opportunities to lie about material facts
successfully. Concerns for reputation and effectiveness in future encounters with
mediators encourage truth-telling. The presence of clients typically required for
711 (Iowa 2003) (lawyer who lied about client owning a business in negotiation to sell that business
held liable for fraud); Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1990) (lawyer who
denied regulatory investigation of client could be sued for fraud). Negotiator-agents are not relieved of
liability for their torts simply because they acted on behalf of clients. Rex Perschbacher, Regulating
Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 ARIz L. REv. 75, 87 (1985).
22. E.g., In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 767 (D.C. 1990) (lawyer's deliberately misleading answers to
IRS agent constituted deceit); McVeigh v. McGurren, 117 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1940) (attorney who lied
about his client's ability to pay a large child support debt when client had just received a substantial
inheritance held liable for deceit).
23. Perschbacher, supra note 21, at 107-12.
24. Supra note 19. Other cases disciplining lawyers for lying during non-mediated negotiations
include: Fla. Bar v. Varner, 780 So. 2d I (Fla. 2001) (lying about filing suit and submitting a fictitious
notice of voluntary dismissal); Fla Bar v. Adams, 641 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1994) (letter falsely accusing
another attorney of suborning perjury); In re Skinner, 214 N.W. 652 (Minn. 1927) (willfully making
false statement to a third person warrants disciplinary proceeding). Cases disciplining lawyers for
assisting client fraud involving negotiating outside of mediation include: Fla. Bar v. Beaver, 248 So.
2d 477 (Fla. 1977) (counseling client to conceal assets during divorce and helping client disperse
money in trust account warrants suspension); In re Mussman's Case, 286 A.2d 614 (N.H. 1971) (help-
ing client create fraudulent transfer unethical).
25. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 139. litigating the enforceability of mediation agreements
supplies one of two most common components of the rapidly growing law about mediation as it be-
comes more institutionalized and more widely used. James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediat-
ing in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REv. 171, 172 (2001).
Most issues surrounding confidentiality of statements made in civil mediations deal with claims of
misconduct by parties such as fraud or capacity to contract issues. James M. Bowie, Ethical Issues in
Construction Mediation: Are There Any Rules, 24 CONSTR. LAW. 33, 37 (2004).
26. Steven D. Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations: Interim Report and Preliminary Findings
(1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file with New York University Law Review).
27. Id. See generally Robert B. Gordon, Note, Private Settlement as Alternative Adjudication: A
Rationale For Negotiation Ethics, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 503, 508 n.29 (1985).
28. Survey responses (March 26, 2004) (on file with author). The range for the 21 responses to this
question ranged from a high of 89% to a low of 0% and the median was 20%. Id. The questionnaire
defined material facts as "event, subject, and other specifics affecting deals or dispute resolutions that
fraud law would consider actionable as going beyond puffing or acceptable exaggeration." Id.
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court-connected mediations often means that material fact lies require party com-
plicity. Caucuses give mediators opportunities to converse directly about and
indirectly around suspected misrepresentations. With capable attorney representa-
tion, effective use of broad civil discovery provisions also limits opportunities to
lie about material facts.
Nevertheless, reported decisions 29 and anecdotal evidence suggest that law-
yers lie about material facts when negotiating during mediations. One mediation
scholar reported that "some attorneys, operating under the assumption that ...
[mediations are] entirely confidential, have bragged about resolving the case by
misrepresentation. '" 30 Another noted the reports of several Texas mediators that
lawyers regularly lie during mediations. 31 Survey respondents were asked to indi-
cate how often they believed they observed lies about material facts in joint ses-
sions versus caucuses. The average of survey respondents' estimates was that lies
occurred in 25% of the joint sessions in which they participated.32 The average of
respondents' estimates of lies about material facts in caucuses was that they oc-
curred in 17% of the mediations in which they participated.33
Respondents' estimates that more material fact lying occurred in joint ses-
sions than in caucuses probably reflect the questionnaires' option only to self-
disclose when lawyers evaluate caucus behaviors.34 This difference may suggest
that lawyers occasionally choose to communicate deception directly in joint ses-
sions to avoid how mediators translate, embellish, diminish, reframe, and ignore
lawyer statements when carrying messages between caucuses. In addition, predic-
29. E.g., In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780 (D.C. 1990) (lawyer's lie to mediator about representing an
apparently liable but non-named defendant held not material).
30. KIMBERLEE KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 142 (1994). Attorneys typically
lead negotiations and talk more during mediations. An empirical study showed that lawyers talked
more than clients in 63% of the matters and talked an equal amount of time in 31% of the sessions.
Rosselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know From Em-
pirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 641, 658 (2002).
31. Lynne H. Rambo, Impeaching Lying Parties With Their Statements During Negotiation: Demys-
ticizing the Public Policy Rationale Behind Evidence Rule 408 and the Mediation Privilege Statutes,
75 WASH. L. REv. 1037, 1091 n.210 (2000).
32. Survey responses (March 26, 2004) (on file with author). The range for the twenty responses on
this question was from a high of 80% to a low of 0% with a median of 20%. Id.
33. Id. The range for the eighteen responses was from a high of 80% to a low of 0% with a median
of 10%. Id.
34. Most of this discrepancy probably results from the fact that respondents who were not mediators
would have to answer this question by estimating their own lies about material facts because they
presumably did not observe other lawyers in caucuses except in multi-party contexts. Respondents
who were mediators, however, also estimated observing more lying about material facts in joint ses-
sions than in caucuses. The average of the estimates from the four mediators who shared them regard-
ing these categories was that material fact lies occurred in 30% of joint sessions and 15% of caucuses
on the mediations in which they participated. Id. The likelihood that lawyers may not have negotiated
substantially before court-ordered mediations, which presumably supplied the bulk of these respon-
dents' experiences, may explain these estimate averages regarding material fact lying occurring more
in joint sessions than in caucuses. Whatever the explanation, this response does not confirm predic-
tions that the mere presence of a mediator will produce positive changes in negotiating behavior in the
amount of truth-telling regarding material facts that occurs. See Daniel Bowling & David A. Hoffman,
The Personal Qualities of the Mediator and Their Impact on the Mediation, in BRINGING PEACE INTO
THE ROOM: How THE PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE MEDIATOR IMPACT THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 19-21 (Daniel Bowling & David Hoffman eds., 2003) (arguing the presence of mediators
produces positive changes in negotiating behavior).
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tions that lawyers will exploit the confidentiality that attaches to caucuses to lie
about material facts more than in private sessions may not be accurate.
On the other hand, some lawyers might choose to lie about material facts in
caucuses to take advantage of opportunities to influence mediations within these
confidential sessions. They also may hope that mediators will communicate these
falsehoods in ways that participants deem more legitimate and persuasive.
Mediators may not know when lawyers lie about material facts during media-
tions, particularly when misrepresentations relate to information that is not readily
available to and beyond the reach of other participants. Studies show most hu-
mans are not particularly adept at detecting lies. 35 If the limited research and re-
spondents' estimates accurately predict that lawyers lie about material facts in
17% to 23% of all mediations, it follows that undetected lies occasionally influ-
ence mediated outcomes and resulting agreements.
Sometimes contexts, prior communications, caucus conversations with cli-
ents, or earlier experiences with attorneys raise legitimate concerns about the
truthfulness of important fact representations made in joint sessions or caucuses.
When this happens, mediators may use the common advocacy technique of asking
questions to which they already know the answers as a way to check attorney
truthfulness.36 Mediators also may pursue several options if they suspect the
truthfulness of material fact statements.
One option includes encouraging parties to include representation or warranty
provisions in mediated agreements for fact statements that are essential to induc-
ing acceptance of proposals. Representations are detailed statements about impor-
tant facts, and warranties are promises that these assertions are true. Both of these
provisions lessen the need to base agreements solely on trust. Both supply stan-
dard tools transactional lawyers use to deal with the strategic opportunism pre-
sented by the ability to deceive about material components of deals. This option
can be raised by parties or mediators and, because agreements are usually readily
admissible in evidence, these provisions can avoid many later controversies about
the content of key representations and can focus disputes directly on the truth of
these statements.
Lawyers who reject using representations and warranties naturally increase
mediators' concerns about the truthfulness of the material fact statements they
make. Mediators confronting this challenge may privately discuss the risks of
discovery through pretrial procedures and subsequent challenges to encourage
lawyers and their clients to reframe these situations and reconsider their refusals to
change or warrant their representations. Mediators also may encourage negotia-
tors to make suspected misstatements confidential communications to avoid con-
fronting dilemmas regarding whether and how to share them. Finally, mediators
can choose not to transmit material information that they suspect is false.
35. Robin Marantz Henig, Looking for the Lie, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 2006, at 47. Research suggests
that although most people think they are skilled at spotting liars, fewer than 5% of people have innate
abilities to detect lies with accuracy. Most humans, when tested, spot liars at a level not much better
than chance. Id.; see Paul Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 913 (1991).
36. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 149; Jan Frankel Schau, Secrets and Lies: The Ethics of
Mediation Advocacy, http://www.mediate.com/articles/frankelschauJ 1.cfm (last visited April 7, 2007)
(lies about undiscovered material facts can confound and impede the progress of negotiations).
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Assuming that none of these approaches resolves concerns, mediators may
need to terminate mediations to avoid helping create agreements that involve
fraud. 37 Discussing their ethical obligation to avoid fraudulent agreements at ap-
propriate moments in caucuses may generate modifications of earlier statements
and decisions not to use or make additional false representations.
Current legal trends exempt challenges to mediated agreements based on
claims of material fact misrepresentations from the confidentiality rules that ordi-
narily apply to mediation proceedings. 38 Mediators also may be compelled to
testify regarding the existence of subsequently challenged material fact statements
during the mediation.
39
III. FAILURES TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL FACTS
Analysis of truthful negotiating in and out of mediation typically focuses on
affirmative misstatements, which generally must exist before fraud or ethical scru-
tiny occurs. Circumstances, however, may make the failure to disclose facts or
other information fraudulent and unethical. Explicitly linking ethical regulation to
the American law of fraud, Model Rule 4.1(b) prohibits lawyers from knowingly
failing to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid "assisting"
fraudulent acts by clients unless disclosure is barred by the confidentiality rule.
Comment 1 to Model Rule 4.1 notes that although American lawyers generally
have "no affirmative duty to inform" opposing parties of relevant facts, omitting
facts or other information may be "the equivalent of affirmative false statements."
Section 98(3) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers also
provides that attorneys negotiating may not fail to make disclosures required by
law.
American fraud law generally recognizes disclosure duties when making par-
tial statements that are or become misleading in light of all facts, parties stand in a
fiduciary relationship to each other, non-disclosing parties have vital information
37. E.g., Florida's Standards of Professional Conduct for Mediators provide that mediators shall
terminate mediations entailing fraud. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APP'T MEDIATORS 10.420(b)(4) (2003).
38. E.g., UNIF. MED. ACT § 6(b)(2) (2006). The act, adopted in eight states as of March 2006,
exempts from confidentiality mediation communications offered in claims "to rescind or reform...
contracts arising out of mediation" if proponents can show at an in camera hearing that the evidence is
not otherwise obtainable and the need for the evidence substantially outweighs the interests in protect-
ing it. Id. Florida's confidentiality statute exempts mediation communications "offered for the limited
purpose of establishing or refuting legally recognized grounds for voiding or reforming a settlement
agreement reached during a mediation." FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(5) (2005). See F.D.I.C. v. White,
76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (Federal ADRA does not create a privilege that would
preclude a litigant from challenging the validity of a settlement agreement based on events that tran-
spired at a mediation.).
39. Several opinions allow mediators to disclose the existence of allegedly fraudulent statements.
E.g., Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (permitting mediator to
testify regarding allegations of duress); White, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (alleged duress charge justified
disclosure of mediation communications from all parties); McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d 806,
809-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding confidentiality privilege was waived when wife testified so
that husband could rebut and authorize mediator to testify regarding alleged duress and intimidation
during mediation). UNIF. MED. ACT § 6(c) (2006) (provides that mediators may not be compelled to
testify regarding post-mediation fraud claims based on material fact lies).
(Vol. 2007
When Lawyers Move Their Lips
not accessible to others, or special statutory obligations apply. 4° Negotiated agree-
ments have been set aside for attorneys' failures to disclose the death of the plain-
tiff,4 1 a life-threatening injury about which the plaintiff was ignorant,42 majorjro-
cedural developments affecting a case, existence of insurance coverage, an
autopsy, 45 and changed testimony.
46
This author's research found no empirical studies regarding the frequency
with which attorneys' failures to disclose material facts in these situations occur in
negotiations inside or outside of mediation. The questionnaire did not investigate
this issue. The broad reach of civil discovery and the presence of skilled lawyers
lessen risks of this happening in high stakes, court-connected mediations. This
seems particularly likely when duties exist to correct representations that lawyers
learn were false when made or have become false because of changed circum-
stances.4 7 Although the ABA's House of Delegates deleted a draft recommenda-
tion generally establishing this duty when enacting the Model Rules in 1983, such
obligations are created by discovery provisions 4 or common law.4 9 Mediators
40. SHELL, supra note 16, at 208-09; Barry R. Tempkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settle-
ment Negotiations, Should There Be A Silent Safe Harbor?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179, 181 (2004)
(current trend in ethical analysis suggests that lawyers in some circumstances must correct misappre-
hensions that did not emanate from them or anyone acting on their behalf).
41. Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage, 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983); see also
Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Geisler, 938 S.W. 2d 578 (Ky. 1977) (attorney's failure to disclose the death of her
client to opposing counsel amounted to an unethical affirmative misrepresentation); Kingsdorf v.
Kingsdorf, 797 A.2d 206 (N.J. Super. 2002) (court refused to enforce a settlement agreement where a
lawyer failed to disclose husband had died rendering property wife had given to husband hers by joint
tenancy). The American Bar Association has opined that personal injury lawyers must disclose the
death of their clients before accepting settlement offers. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 95-397 (1995). Although the court's rationale in Virzi was that the plaintiff's lawyer
needed to correct the material misimpression of the other side, the ABA Comm. on Prof'l. Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op 94-387 (1994), approved settling a claim the lawyer knows was barred by the
statute of limitation without disclosing the adversary's apparent misimpression to the contrary. Men-
kel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 140 n.68.
42. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). This Court held that the failure to
disclose the additional injury was a fraud upon the court because the plaintiff was a minor and settle-
ment required court confirmation rather than an omission tantamount to an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 140.
43. Hamilton v. Harper, 404 S.E.2d 540 (W.Va. 1991) (lawyer failed to disclose that summary
judgment had just been granted to insurer deciding no coverage when accepting pre-existing offer from
it).
44. State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Addison, 412 N.W.2d 855 (Neb. 1987) (lawyer disciplined
after failing to reveal existence of insurance coverage to hospital administrator when negotiating re-
lease of hospital's lien).
45. Miss. Bar v. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1983) (lawyer sanctioned for failing to disclose that
an autopsy had been performed in an action for bad faith denial of insurance coverage).
46. Kath v. W. Media, Inc., 684 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1984) (settlement invalidated because attorney failed
to disclose letter from witness contradicting previous deposition testimony).
47. Nathan M. Crystal, The Lawyer's Duty to Disclose Material Facts in Contract or Settlement
Negotiations, 87 KY. L.J. 1055, 1076-82 (1999) (arguing lawyers have an ethical duty to disclose in
these situations). See In re Williams, 840 P.2d 1280 (Or. 1992) (lawyer disciplined for failing to tell
landlord that earlier representation that he would hold tenant's payments in escrow was no longer
correct); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98, cmt. d (2000) (recognizing
duty of corrective disclosure).
48. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e) (imposes a duty on parties to amend and supplement discovery responses if
material information is incomplete or incorrect and the new or changed information is not known to
other parties whether ordered by the court or not).
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traveling between private sessions with participants also may discern what mate-
rial facts really matter to them and thereby identify when significant failures to
disclose occur.
Mediators encounter challenges if lawyers confidentially disclose material
facts that create serious fraud concerns and then instruct mediators not to reveal
them. This disclosure puts in conflict mediators' duties to maintain the confiden-
tiality of caucus disclosures and to not produce fraudulent agreements. When this
situation happens, mediators typically explore the risks run by going forward
without disclosure in terms of successful challenges to resulting agreements and
personal exposure to fraud, intentional or negligent misrepresentation, and mal-
practice claims. They also may mention their ethical duties to terminate rather
than go forward with deals they believe may be later determined to be fraudulent.
Oregon has decided that mediators must terminate mediations in this situation.
50
Mediators who go forward after discovering lawyers or participants are fraudu-
lently withholding material information from others participate in the perpetration
of fraud.5 1
V. LIES ABOUT NON-MATERIAL FACTS AND OPINIONS
Even though it added materiality to ethical analysis of negotiating, the Model
Rules do not define the term "material" directly. Definitions of material fact
statements under the law of contracts and torts vary. Statements about facts have
been deemed material to rescind contracts if they would induce reasonable per-
sons to enter into agreements. 52 Similarly, statements have been deemed material
in tort deceit actions if they would induce reasonable persons to act on them, 53 or
if speakers' had reason to know that respondents would rely on them even if rea-
sonable persons would not.
54
In assessing materiality, the Comments to Model Rule 4.1 make clear that
whether statements should be regarded as material facts depends on the circum-
stances. Comment 2 suggests that "under generally accepted negotiation conven-
tions certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material
fact."5 5  This Comment then lists three examples of statements generally not
49. Tempkin, supra note 40, at 195-207; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAW-
YERS § 98, cmt. d (2000).
50. ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct, Ethics Opinion No. 2002-167 (2001-
2005) (mediator may not mediate a matter to conclusion when lawyer representing a party in a domes-
tic relations matter confidentially disclosed the existence of marital assets unknown to other party,
refused to permit the mediator to share this information, and mediator knew that the assertions were
important to the other party's decision-making).
51. Id.; Rebecca H. Hiers, Navigating Mediation's Unchartered Waters, 57 RUTGERS. L. REV. 531,
574 (2005); see Michael Moffat, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REV. 147, 159 (2003) (potential mediator
liability for tort-based actions).
52. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 470(2) (1932).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2) (1965).
54. Id.
55. The Model Rules provide no substantiation or examples of this empirical claim causing scholars
to wonder who generally accepts these conventions. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 132. Research
showing large and consistent differences among lawyers, judges, and academics, regarding the ethical
appropriateness of common negotiation statements also undermine regulatory reliance on the actual
existence of such conventions. E.g., Dahl, supra note 12; Lempert, supra note 12.
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deemed material facts by negotiation conventions, including "estimates of price or
value placed on" transaction subjects, "party's intentions as to acceptable settle-
ment" of claims, and the "existence of undisclosed" principals except when non-
disclosure constitutes fraud.
In addition, Comment 2 declares that Rule 4.1 applies only to "statements of
fact." This decision to follow old commercial law doctrine that buyers cannot
justifiably rely on a seller's "puffing" about the value of items sold,56 together
with the inclusion in Comment 2 as examples estimates of price and value regard-
ing negotiation subjects, creates ambiguities regarding whether all lawyer lies
about their opinions are ethically permitted. Although not exclusive, the examples
of Comment 2 declare neither factual nor material many communications com-
monly used by negotiating lawyers seeking to claim the value involved in bar-
gained-for items. The categories of Comment 2 encompass a wide array of infor-
mation frequently exchanged during negotiations including inflated or deflated
offers, counteroffers, and concessions; representations regarding clients' settle-
ment intentions; false estimates of value and worth concerning bargaining sub-
jects; and lies about target points, reservation plans, and bottom lines. All of this
information is unquestionably important to negotiations, yet is defined as non-
material or non-factual by Comment 2.
Comment 2 promotes a vision that negotiating is either exclusively or pre-
dominantly a process for claiming value in the issues involved. It encourages
many common value-claiming negotiating behaviors designed to maximize client
gain that are premised on assumptions that doing this inherently requires decep-
tion and misrepresentation. It invites actions that conceal, mislead, and deceive
by purposefully sequenced disclosures, partial disclosures, non-disclosures, and
overstated and understated disclosures. It opens a door for lawyers to lie when
negotiating.57
Available evidence suggests that lawyers routinely use this rule-encouraged
pass from truth-telling in negotiation and make false statements regarding these
information categories seeking to create beliefs in others that differ from their
own.58 A study of one hundred lawyers surveyed at the 1997 American Bar Asso-
ciation Annual Meeting showed 73% admitting they engaged in these types of
statements when they negotiated. 59 Lawyers commonly exaggerate both the value
of their claims and the strength of their arguments and positions.60 Sixty-one per-
cent of the lawyers responding to this 1997 survey indicated a belief that it was
ethically permissible to engage in negotiation puffing by stating false value esti-
56. E.g. Kimball v. Bangs, II N.E. 113, 114 (Mass. 1887). The court noted: "The law recognizes
the fact that men will naturally overstate the value and qualities of articles which they have to sell. All
men know this, and a buyer has no right to rely upon such statements." Id.
57. James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A Proposal to Revise
Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 255, 267 (1999).
58. Tempkin, supra note 40, at 182 (negotiating lawyers often mislead others by half-truths, partial
truths, and misdirection). For example, a leading dispute resolution scholar admits to his students that
he has "rarely participated in legal negotiations in which both participants did not use some misstate-
ments to further client interests." Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics: How To Be Deceptive With-
out Being Dishonest/How to Be Assertive Without Being Offensive, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 713, 715
(1997).
59. Carter, supra note 12, at 97.
60. ROGER HAYDOCK, NEGOTIATION PRACTICE 211 (1984); James J. White, Machiavelli and the
Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. BAR. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 931-32, 934.
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mates and 2rice opinions." Attorneys often view abilities to mislead adversaries
as a virtue.
Questionnaire respondents confirmed that lawyers frequently lie about set-
tlement intentions and value and price estimates. The average of respondents'
estimates was that they observed lawyers lying about the value of negotiation
subjects, defined as "the items, claims, and objectives" involved in bargaining
interactions, in 35% of negotiations in which they participated.63
Negotiators' resistance levels, or bottom lines, are intimately connected to
their clients' intentions regarding claim settlement. They describe the points be-
yond which negotiators would rather do something else than agree and, in
monetized exchanges, they connote the amount beyond which clients will not pay
or accept. The average of respondents' estimates was that they observed lawyers
lie about their resistance levels in 43% of the negotiations in which they were
involved. 64
Not surprisingly, this evidence coincides with data suggesting that a majority
of American lawyers prefer to use value-claiming negotiation approaches. 65 A
survey of 5,000 Denver and Phoenix lawyers showed pervasive use of value-
claiming approaches. 66 Another study of 515 lawyers and 55 judges in New Jer-
sey revealed that about 70% of the cases in which they participated were settled
using predominantly value-claiming actions.
67
Although the survey here did not seek frequency estimates for these types of
lies in mediations, mediators report that lawyers make false statements about these
topics in both joint sessions and caucuses. Lawyer mediators understand that
truth-telling on these topics is not ethically required and, consequently, do not
expect candor when attorneys initiate disclosures regarding them in either joint
sessions or caucuses. Mediators also know that lawyers often use the phrases "in
my opinion" and "I believe," and that the information linked to these opinion-
framing remarks is frequently less than candid.
61. Carter, supra note 12, at 97.
62. Tempkin, supra note 40, at 183.
63. Survey responses (March 26, 2004) (on file with author). The range for the twenty-two re-
sponses on this question was from a high of 100% to a low of 0% and the median was 30%. Id.
64. Id. The range for the 21 responses on this question was from a high of 100% to a low of 0% and
the median was 50%. Id. The questionnaire defined resistance level as "the point beyond which a
negotiator would rather pursue an agreement alternative than reach a negotiated agreement." Id.
65. ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND
NEGOTIATING SKILLS 374 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotia-
tion: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 764-65 (1984); Don Peters, Mapping,
Modeling, and Critiquing: Facilitating Learning Negotiation, Mediation, Interviewing, and Counsel-
ing, 48 FLA. L. REV. 875, 914 (1996).
66. DONALD G. GEFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 29, n.6 (1989); Don
Peters, Forever Jung: Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Learning
Negotiation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 28 n.1 13 (1993). This study was done by Professor Gerald Wil-
liams and it showed that 67% of these lawyers reported that they primarily used adversarial, competi-
tive, value-claiming strategies when they negotiated. GERALD R. WILIAMs, LEGAL NEGOTIATION
AND SETTLEMENT 15-40 (1983).
67. Milton Heumann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Meth-
ods in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want", 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 253, 255
(1997). Sixty percent of the respondents in this survey indicated their belief that value-creating meth-
ods should he used more often. Id.
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In addition, discussing value and price estimates supplies a significant com-
ponent of most court-connected mediations. Extensive conversations about likely
trial outcomes, including projections regarding recoverable damage items, predic-
tions of how decision makers will value claims, and estimates concerning the
effects of evidential strengths and weaknesses, usually occur in caucuses. Media-
tors understand that virtually everything lawyers say on these topics is influenced
by partisan perception and gain-maximizing objectives, highly malleable, and
generally susceptible to revision as conversations continue. The frequency with
which these kinds of deceptive statements occur in negotiating in mediations
largely explains the mediators' comments that began this article.
Little harmful deception generally occurs when mediation negotiations are led
by skilled and prepared lawyers for all participants. Regrettably, lawyers do not
always bring comparable levels of skill, experience, and preparation to mediated
negotiations. Consequently, some of these ethically permitted lies probably ac-
complish gain-maximizing objectives.
Knowing that statements regarding settlement intentions need not be truthful,
effective mediators seldom inquire about resistance points. They rarely assign
much credence to statements lawyers make about their resistance points during
early and mid-points of mediations. Skilled mediators also remain alert to the
persuasive value of resistance level lies late in mediations when negotiating has
reached appropriate bargaining ranges. It is at this point where lawyer lies about
resistance levels often exert significant anchoring and persuasive influences on
other participants. Although mediators seek to narrow remaining gaps and find
other ways to reach agreement after receiving these statements, these lies may also
subtly influence how mediators behave in subsequent caucuses.
Some mediations present particular challenges caused by the potential impact
ethically permissible lies can have on unrepresented participants unsophisticated
in value-claiming negotiation practices.68 Opportunities to face these challenges
increase as court-connected mediation expands in small claims and in low- and
middle-income family matters. Reliance on the assumption contained in Com-
ment 2 of Model Rule 4.1-that general understanding of non-truth telling con-
ventions regarding these matters exists-does not work in these circumstances.
Neither does depending upon frequently offered justifications offered for this
debatable approach to regulating truth-telling, including that allowing lies about
these information categories is necessitated by either the adversarial system or the
inherent nature of negotiation.
6 9
68. Most lawyers possess legal knowledge, negotiating experience (if not ability), and familiarity
with court procedures and judges, which typically gives them advantages when interacting with inex-
perienced participants representing themselves. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Par-
ticipation and Subordination of Poor Tenant's Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533,
556-57 (1992); Erica L. Fox, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in
Negotiation, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 85, 92-93 (1996); Marc Aalanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out
Ahead, Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 95, 98-103 (1974); Beatrice
A. Mouton, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the Small
Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1657, 1662 (1969). One commentator asserted that
attorney misconduct permeates negotiation interactions between lawyers and unrepresented parties
with "misleading presentation of facts and law and over-reaching common." Note, And Justice for
All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2006
(1999).
69. Lowenthal, supra note 15, at 430-41.
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Unrepresented and unsophisticated participants may believe these lies and
make decisions accordingly. Dealing with this challenge puts mediators in a diffi-
cult conflict between their obligations to remain impartial and to promote a level
of informed consent essential to self-determination.70 Mediators may respond to
this challenge by using caucuses to coach unrepresented clients regarding standard
value-claiming negotiation practices and to explore with lawyers who make these
misrepresentations the risks of subsequent actions invalidating these agreements.
With lawyers, mediators can discuss how fraud law is expanding to reach false
opinion statements that use specific language, imply knowledge of facts support-
ing the opinion, invite reliance on a lawyer's greater expertise, conceal contrary
facts, and are directed at vulnerable negotiators. 71 Many mediations, however,
will predictably not include these conversations because (1) mediators rarely
know with accuracy when lawyers lie about rule-defined non-material facts, (2)
the ultimate fairness of outcomes is not a mediator's responsibility, 72 and (3) the
bureaucratic and time pressures found in many of these mediation contexts dis-
courage spending time using these options.73
V. LIES ABOUT NEGOTIATION AUTHORITY
Lawyers negotiate on behalf of clients. This reality makes the extent of their
authority to commit to agreement terms an important issue and creates opportuni-
ties to generate bargaining leverage by misrepresenting settlement authority. Mis-
representations regarding authority include direct falsehoods, such as asserting no
authority to settle for $100,000 when clients have authorized paying precisely that
sum. They also encompass arguably true but deceptive statements, such as claim-
ing no authority to pay $80,000 when clients have authorized giving up to
$100,000, so long as the precise dollar limit is not claimed.
Lawyers disagree about whether these statements are ethically permissible
lies regarding claim settlement intentions falling within the safe harbor of Com-
ment 2. Some lawyers contend that settlement authority lies are permissible nego-
tiation tactics, 74 while others assert that the specific, declarative nature of many of
70. This is one of the more frequent and difficult dilemmas mediators encounter. Robert A. Baruch
Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Practices and Policy Implications,
1994 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 17-28.
71. See SHELL, supra note 16, at 209-12; Lowenthal, supra note 15, at 421.
72. For example, Florida's mediation ethics standards provide that mediators must honor parties'
right of self-determination, and parties must make decisions. Fla. R. for Cert. and Ct.-App't Mediators
10.300, 10.310(a) (2000), available at http://www.mediate.comlarticles/floridarules.cfm.
73. See Don Peters, Oiling Rusty Wheels: A Small Claims Mediation Narrative, 50 FLA. L. REv.
761, 830-31 n.139 (1998).
74. Lempert, supra note 12 (presented the first example to fifteen legal ethics scholars, lawyers,
judges, and magistrates and reported that seven said yes you can do this but they personally would not,
while six said no, this was unethical); JETHRO LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS'
UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 31-32 (1978) (quoting a leading lawyer approving
this tactic); MICHAEL MELTSNER & PHILIP SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 232, 237 (1974) (describing this tactic as commonly used by lawyers
while not personally endorsing it).
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these statements makes them unethical. 75 The average of survey respondents'
estimates was that bargaining authority lies occurred in 36% of the negotiations in
which they participated.76
Participation by parties with authority to settle is usually critical to successful
mediation. The presence of human clients typically required in mediations usually
prevents the effective use of authority lies by lawyers because mediators can ques-
tion and clarify these assertions in caucuses.
VI. LIES ABOUT AGREEMENT ALTERNATIVES
The existence and value of options away from negotiating tables supplies a
key factor in most negotiations and mediations. Comparing BATNAs (best alter-
natives to a negotiated agreement), or BATMAs (best alternatives to a mediated
agreement), to proposals developed during negotiations and mediations supplies a
central method for measuring whether negotiators have found solutions that ex-
ceed what they could obtain elsewhere.
Communications about agreement alternatives take place when parties make
disclosures or respond to questions about them. Whether lies about agreement
alternatives concern material or non-material facts revisits ambiguities created by
Comment 2. These lies also prompt debate regarding whether they should be
considered claim settlement intentions.
Negotiators occasionally lie about available alternatives.77 The average of
survey respondents' estimates regarding lies about agreement alternatives was that
they occurred in 22% of the matters in which they have participated. 78 Like non-
material fact and opinion falsehoods, these lies are likely to have little impact
when received by lawyers and other sophisticated negotiators who do not expect
truth-telling on these topics. As discussed earlier, lawyers run risks using these
lies with unrepresented and unsophisticated negotiators. Courts have found lies
about agreement alternatives fraudulent when professionals were negotiating with
small business owners79 and consumers.
80
Survey responses suggest that lawyers often lie about alternatives when nego-
tiating in mediations. The average of respondents' estimates of lies about agree-
ment alternatives was that they occurred in 25% of joint sessions in which they
75. Roger Fisher, A Code of Negotiation Practices for Lawyers, 1 NEGOT. J. 105, 106 (1985); Lem-
pert, supra note 12, at 1. Professor Gary Luban argues that "people have to be able to rely on flat-out
declarations... or the process breaks down or, at best, becomes incredibly time-consuming." Id.
76. Survey responses (March 26, 2004) (on file with author). The range for the twenty-one re-
sponses to this question was from a high of 100% to a low of 0% and the median was 20%. Id.
77. SHELL, supra note 16, at 210. A well known and successful lawyer argued that it was ethically
permissible to lie about another offer's existence because "'other offers are ancillary' to the intrinsic
value of the item being bargained for." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 142 n.75 (strongly dis-
agreeing with this perspective).
78. Survey responses (March 26, 2004) (on file with author). The range for the twenty responses on
this question was from a high of 75% to a low of 0% and the median was 10%. Id.
79. E.g., Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 692 (Mass. 1952) (landlord's lie that
another tenant was waiting to pay asking price held fraudulent).
80. E.g., Beavers v. Lamplighter Realty, Inc., 556 P.2d 1328 (Okla. Civ. App. 1976) (realtor's lie
that rival buyer was willing to pay asking price that same day held fraudulent).
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participated. 8' In caucus, mediators will typically analyze agreement alternatives
as they help parties explore their predictions regarding likely non-agreement op-
tions and their economic, social, and psychological costs. Survey respondents
suggested that lawyers may act slightly more truthfully in caucuses as the average
of their estimates was that lies about agreement alternatives in caucuses occurred
in 20% of the mediatiops in which they participated.82
VII. LIES ABOUT INTERESTS AND PRIORITIES
Accepting a premise that all negotiations present opportunities to create as
well as claim and distribute value, 8 3 mediators typically encourage negotiators to
minimize costs and explore other ways to generate gain for all participants. When
doing this, mediators often direct conversations to additional information catego-
ries beyond than those regulated by current ethical rules. These information cate-
gories emphasize interests and priorities.
Mediation participants inevitably define their interests as maximizing gain re-
garding the issues they present to negotiate. However, mediators usually pursue a
vision of interests broader than the negotiating subjects presented with their
claims and defenses-issues that are always monetized in court-connected media-
tions. Honest disclosures and responses to questions posed about non-monetized
interests and priorities facilitate value-creating negotiation by helping parties iden-
tify solutions that can generate mutual benefit.
Disclosures and responses to questions about non-monetized interests permits
one to get to the heart of a situation by uncovering what claims and issues are
really about. Often conducted in caucuses, these conversations explore the core of
what participants seek as well as what motivates them most strongly. Non-
monetized interests and needs lie underneath the divergent and conflicting posi-
tions, justifications, and supporting and attacking argumentation that supply the
bulk of value-claiming negotiation discourse. Explaining why money is needed,
and discovering other ways negotiators can satisfy their interests, supplies differ-
ent directions mediators can pursue to explore non-monetized interests.
Non-monetized interests and needs also exist on several levels beyond sub-
stantive issues including procedural, process, and emotional dimensions. Devel-
oping specific information about participants' underlying interests on all of these
levels often reveals that negotiators possess shared and independent, as well as
directly conflicting, needs. This realization frequently helps negotiators discover
options and proposals that create value.
Linked to interest discussions are conversations about priorities, in which par-
ticipants assess their needs in terms of which needs are most and least important.
Research and human experience shows that negotiation participants rarely value
81. Survey responses (March 26, 2004) (on file with author). The range for eighteen responses to
this question was from a high of 75% to a low of 0% and the median was 25%. Id.
82. Survey responses (March 26, 2004) (on file with author). The range for the eighteen responses
to this question was from a high of 50% to a low of 0% with a median of 15%. Id.
83. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS
AND DisPuTEs 4 (2000) (arguing that all negotiations, while inevitably involving distributive issues
regarding who gets how much, also present opportunities to create joint value and find joint gain).
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all aspects of issues subject to negotiation identically. 84 Honest disclosures and
responses to questions about priorities often generates trading, the most common
form of value creation, where negotiators exchange items they value slightly less
in return for things they value more. Confidential communication made possible
by caucusing increases chances that mediators can gather and use this type of
85data. This enables mediators to enhance negotiations by moving them from the
win-lose approach of value-claiming to more individualized and contextualized
conversations and outcomes that create value.
Lawyers also lie about their client's interests and priorities when negotiating
outside mediations. 86 These lies usually occur when lawyers use a negotiating
tactic variously labeled as phony issues, false demands, red herrings, or decoys.
This tactic involves falsely asserting interests in and priorities concerning specific
issues or claims to gain bargaining chips that can be exchanged for issues negotia-
tors really care about. A common example in family law involves asserting a
false interest and priority in gaining custody of children solely to create leverage
for economic issues in divorce negotiations. Although the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers strongly disapproves of using this lie in divorce negotia-
87tions, in a 1994 survey of California lawyers, 61% reported that they or their
clients received at least one of these threats.
88
Lawyers justify lies about interests and priorities by arguing that they are
value estimates or settlement intentions. 89 Some assert that these lies comprise
standard behavior for negotiators in certain contexts. 90 The average of respon-
dents' estimates of lies about interests, defined as "the needs, objectives, and is-
sues of importance to negotiators' clients," was that they happened in 17% of the
negotiations in which they participated. 91 Their average estimate of observed lies
about priorities was that they occurred in 18% of the negotiations in which they
participated.92
Research shows that misrepresenting interests and priorities often leads to fa-
vorable value-claiming outcomes in non-mediated negotiations. 93  Unless de-
tected, these lies also are likely to lead to favorable outcomes in mediated negotia-
tions. Limited evidence suggests that lawyers lie about both interests and priori-
ties in mediations. For example, an Indiana lawyer maintained a website suggest-
84. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 65, at 377, 379-84.
85. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need Mediation For?": Mediation's "Value-Added"
for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Dis. RES. 1, 13 (1996).
86. Lawyers frequently assert phony demands, lie about their clients' needs, and deceive about their
interest in agreement when their real objective is delay. HAYDOCK, supra note 60, at 212.
87. Rule 6.2, American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers' Goals for Family Lawyers provides that
lawyers should not permit clients to contest custody for financial leverage.
88. Scott Altman, Lurking in the Shadow, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 493,499 (1994).
89. Lowenthal, supra note 15, at 423.
90. White, supra note 60, at 934-35.
91. Survey responses (March 26, 2004) (on file with author). The range of the twenty responses to
this question was from a high of 70% to a low of 0% and the median was 15%. Id.
92. Id. The range of the twenty-one responses to this question was from a high of 50% to a low of
0% and the median was 10%. Id.
93. Kathleen M. O'Connor & Peter J. Carnevale, A Nasty but Effective Negotiation Strategy: Mis-
representation of a Common-Value Issue, 23 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 504 (May
1997).
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ing that clients lie and create "throw away" demands to achieve successful media-
tion results. 94
Survey responses verified the concern expressed by several scholars that law-
yers will transfer their adversarial negotiating tactics to mediations in ways that
undermine its potential to develop value-creating outcomes.95 The average of
respondents' estimates of lies about interests in joint sessions of mediations was
that they occurred in 19% of the mediations in which they participated.9 6 Their
average estimate of lies about priorities in joint sessions was that they occurred in
16% of the matters in which they participated.97 In caucus, respondents reported
only slightly less frequency. Their average estimate of lies about interests in cau-
cuses was that they occurred in 15% of the mediations in which they partici-
pated.98 The average of respondents' estimates of lies about priorities in caucuses
was that they also occurred 15% of the time.99
In light of these estimates, the common practice of effective mediators to
maintain an optimistic skepticism regarding how lawyers and their clients describe
their interests and priorities, particularly during initial conversations, seems war-
ranted. This skepticism probably diminishes the effectiveness of lies about inter-
ests and priorities in early mediation stages when mediators expect descriptions to
be tentative and dependent upon information and ideas that emerge as the process
unfolds.
Many characteristics of contemporary mediation constrain lawyers' abilities
to lie successfully about interests and priorities. Opportunities for expanded pri-
vate conversations allow mediators to explore and assess the genuineness of asser-
tions about interests and priorities. The presence and participation of clients also
provide frequent clues about candor when these topics are discussed. Effective
mediators observe and listen actively to the emotional dimensions of communica-
tions when participants share them. These emotional components often provide
insights about what really matters and clues regarding truthfulness when conversa-
tions turn later to potential solutions that include non-monetized interests.
On the other hand, common aspects of mediation practice may increase op-
portunities for lawyers to lie about interests and priorities later in mediated nego-
tiations. Mediators frequently seek to expand negotiation agendas by asking ques-
94. In re Philpot, 820 N.E. 2d 141 (Ind. 2005) (attorney stipulated to discipline for engaging in false,
fraudulent, and misleading public communication).
95. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Ethics for Whom: The Recognition of Diversity in Lawyering Calls for
Plurality in Ethical Considerations and Rules of Representational Work, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 57, 62-63 (Phyllis Bernard & Byrant Garth eds., 2002). See infra
note 106.
96. Survey responses (March 26, 2004) (on file with author). The range for the eighteen responses
to this question was from a high of 50% to a low of 0% and the median was 23%. Id.
97. Id. The range for the twenty responses to this question was from a high of 50% to a low of 10%
and the median was 10%. Id. The questionnaire defined priorities as "how clients comparatively rank
their interests, needs, objectives and includes resources, relative valuations, future forecasts, willing-
ness to take risks, and time preferences." Id.
98. Id. The range for the eighteen responses to this question was from a high of 50% to a low of 0%
and the median was 10%. Id. The average of estimates from mediator respondents was that slightly
more lying occurred about interests in caucuses, 15%, than in joint sessions, 14%. Id.
99. Id. The range for the eighteen responses to this question was from a high of 50% to a low of 0%
and the median was 10%. Id. The average of estimates from mediator respondents was that more lying
about priorities occurred in caucuses, 15%, than in joint sessions, 10%. Id.
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tions regarding other, typically non-monetized, issues that may be of value to
participants. These questions target things that, while measurable in money, exist
apart from negotiators' interests in maximizing their gain regarding initially iden-
tified bargaining items and claims. Doing this late in mediated negotiations often
helps participants bridge remaining monetary gaps between their articulated bar-
gaining positions.
Mediators explore non-monetized interests and priorities seeking low-cost,
high-value trades and other ways to move past the narrow ways disputing parties
usually frame negotiations and the limited remedies courts can provide. These
efforts often help lawyers and clients realize that agreements can include "things
other than money, such as structured annuities, future work, letters of apology,
product discount programs, bartered services, use of equipment, joint undertakings
to raise settlement dollars, and bid invitations."'1°° However, information gener-
ated about these and other agenda-expanding possibilities provides opportunities
for alert negotiators to learn that their counterparts value something highly that
their clients do not desire. This may encourage some negotiators to lie about their
clients' interests and priorities regarding these items in order to extract significant
concessions.
Mediation practice also facilitates successful lying about interests and priori-
ties by providing confidential caucuses where lawyers can skillfully integrate their
deceptions into relative value trades. This permits lawyers using such lies to
avoid the risk of winning on phony issues and ending up with things not really
valued,101 Although skillful questioning and listening by mediators in caucus may
unmask clumsy lies about interests and priorities,' : and although contexts and
clients may provide additional clues regarding unreliability, it seems likely that
lawyers can integrate strategically timed lies about interests and priorities into
discussions about potential value-creating trades.
This leaves mediators vulnerable to skillful interest and priority lies, particu-
larly late in mediations when they seek to shift participants from apparent impasse
to more flexible, need-based options. Mediators may then use these lies to present
trades to other participants that promote false value-creation proposals. Believing
they are promoting joint gain, mediators may unwittingly help substitute decep-
tion-based outcomes for agreements based on genuine interest and priority ac-
commodations. Mediators may reduce this risk by asking lawyers and their cli-
ents to stipulate to making only honest disclosures about non-monetized interests
and priorities.
100. Lawrence M. Watson, Initiating the Settlement Process-Ethical Considerations, in DISPUTE
RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 7, 16 (Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2005);
see also Steven Schwartz, The Mediated Settlement: Is It Always Just About The Money? Rarely!, 4
PEPP. DiSp. RESOL. L.J. 309, 314 (2004) (Most mediations include some non-monetized interests.).
101. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 284 (5th ed.
2005).
102. See O'Connor & Carnevale, supra note 93, at 505; see also Ken Kressel et al., The Settlement
Orientation vs. the Problem-Solving Style in Custody Mediation, 50 J. Soc. ISSUES 67 (1994) (Lies
about interests and priorities in custody were detected in one case where the negotiator made no at-
tempt to accomplish his false demands.).
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VIII. A PROPOSED REFORM TO ENCOURAGE TRUTHFULNESS IN VALUE-
CREATION
It is not surprising that many lawyers use their win-lose negotiation habits
featuring extensive lying in ways that undermine mediation's potential to reach
different outcomes. 1°3 These behaviors flow from a frame of reference most law-
yers use resulting from their immersion in an adversary system. This frame then
supplies the action orientation with which many lawyers are most familiar and
comfortable. Our current regulatory approach in Model Rule 4.1 and its Com-
ments accommodates and promotes this orientation. It creates an ambiguous regu-
latory approach based on a categorical structure that is "patch work and intui-
tive," 1°4 "primitive and obtuse,"'
05 and "very nebulous."' 1 6
Changing these behavior habits will not be easy. Lies about interests and pri-
orities, particularly with respect to non-monetized issues, do the most harm to
mediation's potential to help parties find solutions that differ from the win-lose
outcomes adjudication supplies. Lies about non-monetized interests and priorities
help deceivers claim value, but do nothing to create value. They help negotiators
divide a pie favorably in their self-interests, but do nothing to expand a pie to
benefit all. Lies about non-monetized interests and priorities often obscure efforts
to identify other possibilities beyond the win-lose, gain-maximizing solutions that
benefit some, but not all, negotiators.
Lawyers who lie about this information leave behind opportunities to find
joint gain that benefits them as well as other participants. Lawyers victimized by
these lies may needlessly sacrifice value that could be retained if genuine value-
creating occurred. If done successfully in mediations, lies about non-monetized
interests and priorities transform efforts to create joint gain into disguised, but
ultimately the same, gain-maximizing outcomes that value claiming produces.
The disappearance of non-monetized interest and priority lies, when they are
exchanged for items genuinely valued, does not diminish the harm they do to the
mediation process. Effective mediators can help participants diminish the out-
come influence of deception condoned by the legal profession's approval of lies
about value estimates and settlement claim intentions. They do this by encourag-
ing conversations to move from value-claiming discussions toward potentially
value-creating options involving non-monetized interests and priorities.
Mediators, however, have no refraining options when lawyers lie about their
non-monetized interests and priorities. They can do nothing beyond what they
already do in distributional bargaining: help negotiators manage the tensions gen-
103. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 148 n.89 (mediators report encountering, especially in cau-
cuses, the same dissembling and deceptive negotiating behaviors that occur in non-mediated negotia-
tion); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Inno-
vation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1 (1991) (fearing that adversarial actions
will co-opt mediation rather than predicting that ADR ideology will transform litigation influenced,
win-lose practices).
104. Tempkin, supra note 40, at 180.
105. Walter M. Steele, Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1387
(1986).
106. Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for
Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 935. 951 (2001).
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erated by value-claiming, and find objective standards and other ways to reach
midpoints within largely preset exchange parameters. Although important, this
work does not accomplish mediation's potential to create value.
Lying begets more deception and lessens our expectations of each other and
the systems in which misrepresentations occur.'0 7 The expectations created by the
approach of Rule 4.1 is that lawyers will lie about certain things when negotiating
so attorneys and mediators do not anticipate truth-telling about these topics.
These assumptions and actions that they inspire easily become self-fulfilling
prophecies.10 8 This may be tolerable for value-claiming negotiating because we
have experienced it so long that it has become engrained in lawyers' attitudes and
behavioral habits. The legal community may also accept this situation because
mediators have ways of moving beyond these actions to pursue value-creating.
When lies about non-monetized interests and priorities become expectations,
however, lawyers will soon experience them as requirements and then start de-
ceiving others about these topics to avoid exploitation. 109 This defeats lawyers'
inclinations to share information about non-monetized interests and priorities
honestly in mediations. It lessens mediators' abilities to explore genuine needs
accurately in order to develop complimentary outcomes and joint gain.'10
The proposed regulatory reform is to amend state versions of Rule 4.1 and its
Comments to clarify current ambiguities by prohibiting false statements about
interests and priorities. Putting this in the text of Rule 4.1 as a separate subsection
gives it the most binding effect, but adding it to comments will also accomplish
important objectives. Defining interests to include all aspects of clients' needs
and concerns that do not directly involve efforts to maximize gain regarding origi-
nal claims or transaction subjects will help clarify ambiguities. This definition
also helps distinguish interests from value estimates and settlement intentions
concerning presented claims and negotiation subjects where lies are now permit-
ted by Comment 2.
The need to preserve mediation's potential as a viable forum for interest-
based negotiating provides the primary justification for this proposal. Legislative
and administrative bodies that create or encourage mediation schemes frequently
endorse the interest-based negotiating that these approaches allow."' Many law-
yers and participants use mediation to help them determine whether sharing im-
portant information privately can help them obtain outcomes that exceed what
they can negotiate on their own. 1 2 Mediators cannot foster joint, interest-based
negotiating and use privately shared information effectively to create value if
lawyers are ethically permitted to lie about non-monetized interests and priorities.
Enacting this reform now makes sense because many American lawyers are
either not familiar with mediation or do not know how to represent clients effec-
tively before and during it. Perhaps respondents' estimates suggesting that inter-
est and priority lies were observed in only 15% to 19% of mediation joint sessions
107. See generally SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978).
108. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 147.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 44-1011(2) (2005) (defining the role of a mediator as in part "fostering joint
problem-solving").
112. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 147.
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and caucuses reflect lawyers' unfamiliarity with the value of discussing non-
monetized interests in mediations. This proposal provides guidance and helps
lawyers better balance their advocacy roles with an appreciation for and behaviors
consistent with mediation's potential to achieve different, and often better, out-
comes than adjudication and value-claiming negotiation typically produce. When
complying with this standard lawyers will not have to make statements about their
non-monetized interests and priorities if they do not want to. If they do make
statements about their clients' non-monetized interests and priorities, however,
they must communicate truthfully.
The difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing violations of this proposed
rule supplies a strong argument against adopting this proposal. Interests and pri-
orities, like value estimates and claim settlement intentions, are malleable and
reside primarily within the minds of lawyers and their clients. Like value esti-
mates and claim settlement intentions, interests and priorities evolve and shift
during mediations as relationships among participants and mediators develop.
Mediations are usually dynamic experiences that continually develop new infor-
mation which often causes participants to re-evaluate risks and reframe objec-
tives." 3 These re-evaluations and reframes are typically strongly influenced by
participants' emerging sense of what is important to themselves and others and
what is possible in the negotiation. 14 These dynamic events influence perceptions
of interests and priorities so earlier expressions can give way to later revisions
without conscious attempts to lie. This fluid environment makes it even more
difficult to discern and prove lies regarding non-monetized interests and priorities.
Unlike concerns that mandating an ambiguous standard like good faith par-
ticipation in mediation will generate more adversarial struggle," 5 this proposed
reform will not produce many claims of violations. One negotiator seldom knows
with certainty what another's claim settlement intentions are, and genuine inter-
ests and priorities similarly reside so strongly in the minds of lawyers and their
clients that lies about them can rarely be detected. So while the proposed reform
is admittedly difficult to enforce, it also is not likely to generate unintended and
negative consequences.
This proposal's prohibition may influence the beliefs and actions of lawyers
even if it is difficult to enforce. 1 6 The relatively low estimates of interest and
priority lies suggests that the rule will not be undercut by an overwhelming ten-
dency on the part of lawyers to violate it, a justification often offered for the ap-
proach of Rule 4.1.1 17 Lawyers know when efforts to broaden negotiating agendas
beyond original claims and negotiation subjects inject non-monetized interests
into discussions. This proposal will let lawyers know that when this happens, they
must make an ethical choice to speak honestly or falsely about these different
topics.
113. John W. Cooley, Defining the Ethical Limits of Acceptable Deception in Mediation, 4 PEPP.
DIsp. RESOL. L.J. 263, 275 (2004).
114. David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, Interests: The Measure of Negotiation, 2 NEG. J. 73, 88
(1986).
115. E.g., John Lande, Using Dispute Resolution Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participa-
tion in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REv. 69, 86-108 (2002).
116. Lowenthal, supra note 15, at 443.
117. Id. at 441-44.
[Vol. 2007
When Lawyers Move Their Lips
Creating an objective rule may help lawyers change their behavior because
lawyers are generally familiar with rules and comfortable measuring their actions
against regulations. Simplifying this ethical choice also may encourage compli-
ance with the admittedly imperfect guideline and increase ethical behavior." 
8
Finally, just as many believe that Rule 4.1 and Comment 2 were adopted to pre-
serve adversarial, value-claiming bargaining, so should this proposal be adopted to
preserve problem solving, value-creating negotiating, particularly in mediations.
IX. CONCLUSION
Questionnaire respondents shared average estimates confirming, as many me-
diators have noted, that lawyers are lying in mediated negotiations. This data
reflected the level of lying discovered by research concerning prohibited lies
about material facts. This limited information suggests that deception concerning
interests and priorities, the core ingredients of value-creating negotiation, occurs
at about the same 20% rate. Estimated averages regarding information categories
of negotiation authority and alternatives reflected the ambiguities inherent in the
legal profession's current regulatory approach. Greater estimated averages were
shared regarding information categories where the legal profession's ethical regu-
lation posits debatable general conventions and allows lying about common value-
claiming negotiating actions.
This data adds to an emerging general sense that relying on lawyer truth-
telling in mediated negotiations is risky. It also supports often expressed concerns
that lawyer behaviors suited for win-lose adjudicative environments threaten me-
diation's potential to generate different outcomes. Why lawyers who often par-
ticipate in imposing and enforcing strict standards of truth-telling on other profes-
sionals when they bargain should be less subject to candor requirements when
they negotiate remains a puzzling and questionable premise. Although no direct
linkages have been established, little doubt exists that the latitude given to lawyers
to lie while negotiating contributes to the public's generally low impression of
attorney honesty.
Effective lawyers know that they do not need to lie to negotiate effectively. 119
They refrain from making false statements about value estimates and settlement
intentions and deflect or reframe questions they receive about these topics. Law-
yers who frame negotiations on these categories often display lesser skills levels,
lack of comprehensive preparation,' 20 and greater willingness to lie to claim value.
Research demonstrates a connection between honest negotiating and per-
ceived effectiveness. The study of 5,000 Denver and Phoenix lawyers mentioned
earlier found that honest, ethical, and trustworthy behavior were among the impor-
tant traits of effective negotiators. 21 A more recent study of 727 Chicago and
Milwaukee attorneys showed that when asked to described the characteristics of
118. Tempkin, supra note 40, at 227.
119. Scott R. Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate: A Brief Introduction to Problems of Perfect Ethics in
Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 83, 94 (2002).
120. One questionnaire respondent noted that "some lawyers come to mediation so poorly prepared
that they don't know that they don't know what they are talking about." Survey response (March 26,
2004) (on file with author).
121. WILLIAMS, supra note 66, at 20-30.
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effective problem-solving negotiators, "ethical" was the most common adjective
used while trustworthy was the fifth most frequent descriptor.' 22 Reforming the
approach of Rule 4.1 as suggested encourages effective negotiation through truth-
telling when it is needed most to let mediation actually pursue outcomes other
than compromised win-lose results.
122. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Nego-
tiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 179-80 (2002).
[Vol. 2007
